

«“PHTHONOS” AND “NEMESIS” AS THE EMOTIONS OF THE HUMAN MIND»

Vukan Slavković

Abstract: Understanding of the specific meanings of jealousy and envy differs from culture to culture. Some attitudes indicate how a diverse form of base instincts and thoughts, manifested in jealousy, effects below the level of consciousness. In this article are analysed the motives of jealousy, whose multidisciplinary reflects in the interpretation of this notion from philosophical, psychological, and sociological aspects. The jealousy of some people can be directed at anything they want: professional interests, their friends, even children. This form of jealousy can be characterised as an aggressive attack that, foremost, leads to the commission of a crime, and it is expressed by using violent methods to shed light on relations. In the context of our research, jealousy remains a field of description of a versatile feeling whose motive initiates a willing process and leads to different consequences. The basic form of jealousy is the excitement of a spirit that is not subjugated by reason but initiates unbridled forms of its manifestation.

Keywords: crime of passion, jealousy, envy, emotions, ill-will, moral indignation

*“Redemption, remorse, can reconcile a man with himself.
With others, remorse redeems him, but the consequences
go in their terrible order”.*
(Gertsen 1951, 626)

1. Introduction

“Envy” and “envious” are derived from the Latin *invidia* and *invidiosus*, which have the same meanings: to feel displeasure and ill-will at the superiority of (another person) in happiness, success, reputation, or the possession of anything desirable (Schoeck 2010, 17-18). In Greek, “phthonos” (envy) is the negative but perhaps expected response to another’s success (Goldhill 1990, 138). Aristotle draws distinction between feeling pain at another’s undeserved success (nemesis) and feeling pain at another’s success, not because the success is undeserved but because the other is your peer (phthonos) (Kaster 2005, 84).

According to F. Schleiermacher, “Jealousy is a passion that assiduously searches for what creates suffering. (Büchmann 1876,80) Envy, however, designates a more sinister state that contains the pain of inferiority, irritation, and ill feeling toward the individual who affects us disagreeably by the mere fact of

his superiority (Gesell 1906, 466-467). Envy is an uneasiness of the mind, caused by the consideration of the good we desire, obtained by one we think should not have had it before us (Locke 1876, 357). Jealousy, by contrast, necessarily occurs when a person fears losing an important relationship with another person to a rival. As with envy, episodes of jealousy may involve a number of specific effects. For jealousy, these includes fear of loss, anxiety, and suspiciousness and anger about betrayal. Envy involves two elements (oneself and a person to whom one compares poorly), whereas jealousy requires three (oneself, a partner with whom one has a relationship, and a rival to whom one fears that this relationship will be lost). Envy involves comparing poorly with others on characteristics that are important to oneself, whereas jealousy involves fear of rejection by another in preference to someone who may be one's inferior in all other respects (Parrott 1993, 906-907).

C. Izard emphasized that jealousy awakens fundamental emotions, such as fear and anger. The emotion of anger, depicted in the phenomenon of jealousy, occurs when a man feels that all his attempts to regain the attention of a significant object, love, and sense of security have become unsuccessful (Izard, 1991, 397). Anger must not merely move, but break out of bounds, being an impulse. No impulse can take place without the consent of the mind; for it cannot be that we should deal with revenge and punishment without the mind being cognizant of them. A man may think himself injured, may wish to avenge his wrongs, and then maybe persuaded by some reason or other to give up his intention and calm down. This is not an anger, it is an emotion of the mind which is under the control of reason. Anger is that which goes beyond reason and carries her away with it (Seneca 1963: 35).

Jealousy and envy are most often seen as phenomena that occur in partnerships and friendships; however, they can occur in different areas of life. A threat to any value can trigger this emotion. Envy is as the sunbeams, that beat hotter upon a bank or steep rising ground than upon a flat. And for the same reason those that are advanced by degrees are less envied than those that are advanced suddenly and *per salium* (Bacon 1905: 745).

In the Homeric poems, *phthonos* talk is a way of signaling information about the nature of one's participation in the crucial social system of reciprocity. In particular, it flags the darker emotions: feelings of resentment and anger at being involved in a system that requires one to give or to receive, or to observe others' giving or receiving (Eidinow 2016, 145). Emotions have psychological values and vital functions which serve as survival instincts in man. However, they differ in their aims in that they have both attractive and aversive characteristics such that they move him either to seek or to avoid necessary objects that enhance or harm his existence, respectively.¹ Considering the subjective experiences of pains and pleasures of emotions, they dispose a man to virtuous actions towards excellence (Egbekpalu 2021, 75.).

According to A. Camus, "who the man is, he restrains himself". The true good for man consists of that what leads to knowledge and action under the leadership of reason. Socrates' basic thought of morality is no one sins voluntarily. A man sins because he doesn't know what is right, and not because he doesn't want the law; human action is not governed by will but by the mind, from which nothing is stronger. Therefore, everyone should improve his mind, and gain real knowledge, and man will immediately stay away from evil and do good. The basic position on which Socrates based his ethics, which is evidenced by Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle, was consisted of his attitude "that every virtue is knowledge and that it is the same thing "to know what is right" and "to be rightful". Socrates would be absolutely right if the mind manages the will, but everyday experience shows that the mind is often subject to an elemental influx of lust and passion (Đurić 1959, 157-158). The violator's force allows him to do injustice to an ordinary man, and his weakness forces him to obey justice. According to Plato, our

¹ Emotions are "complex, episodic, dynamic, and structured." The first descriptor, "complex," brings to the fore that an emotion is not a singular phenomenon, but multiple. An emotion is composed of disparate elements: emotional experiences, perceptions, thoughts, feelings, bodily changes, dispositions. They are episodic in that they come and go and come again, and dynamic in that emotional experiences vary with other factors, including past emotional experiences and others' reactions to them. [Steven Wagschal, *The literature of jealousy in the age of Cervantes*, (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2006), 15.]

feelings, if we don't restrain them, can be dangerous for us and others. That's why we have to bring order and harmony into them (Slavković 2020, 156).

Whatever arises from one's power of choice (as every deliberately performed action undoubtedly does) has as its basis a free causality, which from early youth expresses its character in its appearance (the actions). These actions, because of the uniformity of conduct, make recognizable a natural connection; this connection, however, does not render the malicious constitution of the will necessary but is rather the consequence of the voluntarily assumed and immutable evil principles, which only make the will all the more reprehensible and deserving of punishment (Kant 2002, 127).

John Milton describes freedom in his famous verse: "sufficient to have stood but free to fall". But it is exactly this ability to fall that renders us autonomous, free, and moral. In the words of John Harris: "... Milton's insight is the crucial role of personal liberty and autonomy: that sufficiency to stand is worthless, literally morally bankrupt, without freedom to fall. Our freedom to fall is 'precious'" (Protopadakis, 2017, 11).

The mythological symbols of jealousy

The interpretation of jealousy based on socio-psychological factors has a long history. Divine phthonos is the commonly expressed fear through all periods of ancient Greek writing, that the gods resent and punish a human's surpassing of the limitations of human life either in the boast or in the achievement of outstanding success (Goldhill 1991, 138). Divine envy is one of the most familiar and pervasive components of the archaic Greek moral attitude; its origin is in part at least a projection of human envy of success. In the book I of Solon, in his words of wisdom concerning human happiness, tells Croecus that he well knows that "divinity is altogether envious and disturbing". Implicit in these words is the fear that human prosperity encroaches on the territory or the status of the gods and arouses resentment (Douglas 1984, 174).

An examination of the literature of Herodotus, Aeschylus, and Sophocles, shows the intermingling of three types of divine action – I. punishment of sins, II. caprice, III. jealousy. The third is of the greatest importance and suggests that the jealousy of man is in great part responsible for the establishment of the system of law (Ranulf 1933, 327). Phthonos must be understood to describe not only the emotion of the underdog towards his superiors but also a feeling held by those who are successful, including both mortals and gods, to those beneath them. Divine Phthonos encompasses the links between the development of the disinterested tendency to inflict punishment (manifest in criminal law) and the social phenomenon of envy. The gods were seen as 'guardians of justice', but perceptions of their behaviour at particular times turned on socio-political changes, and concomitant dispositions to phthonos among different social classes (Eidinow, 2019, 216). The expansion of criminal law is attributed to moral indignation which is basically a kind of disguised envy. Although somewhat exaggerated and much oversimplified, this conception might be expressed in the well-known wording: moral indignation is a description of our observations of others doing what we would not venture to do ourselves (Jasperse, Van Leeuwen-Burow, Toornvliet 1976, 61).

By analyzing spirit and conscious experiences, we are enabled to understand all the complexities of human nature. The jealousy of some people can be directed at anything they want: professional interests, their friends, even children. This form of jealousy can be characterised as an aggressive attack that, foremost, leads to the commission of a crime, and it is expressed by using of violent methods to shed light on relations. Hence, Szondi (Szondi, 1956) takes the biblical figure of Cain, to mark the brothers' rivalry over fatherly love, and, as it is known from the Bible, Cain, killed his brother Abel out of jealousy, who was a symbol of goodness. It is necessary to point out that Szondi does not interpret the figure of brother-killer Cain from the point of view of religion and ethics, but purely psychologically, as a product of projected archetypal content (Nastović 1989, 522).

The "veils" of our civilization should not occlude the very elementary nature of criminal jealousy, since it lies at the source of our law and culture, as suggested by the biblical story of the fratricide of Cain and the Freudian construct based on the inaugural parricide perpetrated by a coalition of brothers within the primitive hoard. Although these two mythical allegories around the "original" story consider

the crime to be an envious reaction to someone who enjoys desirable prerogatives, the homicide in the former case leads to the proscription of the death penalty along with the acknowledgment of violence *per se*. The crime committed in the latter results in repression and induces unconscious culpability by contributing to the formation of the Superego, whose absence in the civilized man (or rather its overwhelming presence) seems to “drive” criminality (Evezonas 2018, 258).

Immediately at the beginning of the Bible, after the story of the creation of man and original sin, it is spoken about the sons of Adam and Eve. Cain became a farmer, while Abel was a shepherd. When they made sacrifices, God looked at Abel’s victim without caring about Cain’s. It caused Cain’s terrible wrath and hatred towards brother— jealousy arose:

Cain brought the fruit of the ground as an offering to the Lord. And Abel, he also brought of the firstlings of his flock and of the fat thereof. And the Lord had respect to Abel and to his offering: but to Cain and to his offering he had not respect. And Cain was very wroth, and his countenance fell. And the Lord said to Cain, Why are you wroth and why is your countenance fallen? If you do well, shall you not be accepted? and if you do not well, sin lies at the door: and to you shall be his desire, and you shall rule over him. And Cain talked with Abel his brother: and it came to pass, when they were in the field, that Cain rose against Abel his brother, and slew him. And the Lord said to Cain, Where is Abel your brother? And he said, I do not know: Am I my brother’s keeper?

Denial of responsibility reveals his insensitivity, and the answer itself is all the tragedy of this narrative. The following version of the text attracts special attention: “And the Lord said to Cain, Why are you wroth, and why is your countenance fallen? If you offer rightly but do not rightly distinguish, have you not sinned? Fret not yourself, for to you shall be his turning, and you shall rule over him”.

According to A. Augustine, it was this which God enjoined on him who was kindled with the fire of envy against his brother so that he sought to put out of the way him whom he should have set as an example. “Fret not yourself”, He says: withhold your hand from crime; let not sin reign in your mortal body to fulfill it in the lusts thereof “. For to you shall be its turning,” so long as you do not encourage it by giving it the rein but bridle it by quenching its fire. “And you shall rule over it;” for when it is not allowed any external actings, it yields itself to the rule of the governing mind and righteous will, and ceases from even internal motions.

If we understand this sin to be that carnal concupiscence of which the apostle Paul says, “The flesh lusts against the spirit,”² among the fruits of which lust he names envy, by which assuredly Cain was stung and excited to destroy his brother, then we may properly supply the words “shall be,” and read, “To you shall be its turning, and you shall rule over it” (Augustin 1982, 325, 327-329).

The Apostle John, speaking of these brothers, says, “Not as Cain, who was of that wicked one, and slew his brother. And wherefore he slew him? Because his own works were evil, and his brother’s righteous.” He thus gives us to understand that God did not respect his offering because it was not rightly “distinguished” in this, that he gave to God something of his own but kept himself to himself (Augustin 1982, 325–327).

The Bible says God’s response “annoyed Cain exceedingly and his countenance fell.” This connotes a begrudging, resentful, and narcissistic withdrawal, silent yet observable characteristics of envy. Cain’s very name in Hebrew, *Kayin*, connotes “acquisition.” There may also be a phonological suggestion of the word *ayin*, which signifies eyes and looking, further suggestions of envy. Two further issues of significance are Cain’s replies to God. “I do not know” may be one of the first accounts of a lie from one who is inferior to one regarded as superior. “Am I my brother’s keeper?” strongly connotes Cain’s resentment in regard to taking responsibility for Abel’s welfare, the essence of which may be understood as the abnegation of helpfulness and the brotherly attitude of empathetic caring. Both lying and glaring unhelpfulness are key concepts in envy theory. Of note, related to the word “Cain” are the Hebrew-sounding words and the denotation of words for envy: *keen* (noun) and *lekane* (infinitive) (Ninivaggi 2010, 348-349).

² Galatians 5:17.

It should be reminded that envy and jealousy between two brothers or two sisters, especially when they are approximately intelligent or talented, is almost a usual occurrence in families where children struggle for greater love of parents, and that only the removal of one rival (natural or violent death, going abroad, early marriage), encourages the other's ambitions to reach their achievements, but rarely or never without a stronger or weaker, usually unconscious feeling of guilt (Jerotić 2007). A number of murders committed by minors for reasons of jealousy are linked to their opinion that parents or other relatives treated the murdered (brother or sister) "better" than the one who committed that crime (Borodin 2003, 103).

Jealousy as a moral deficiency

The deepest basis of social instincts in man is not reason, but feelings. A man lives through feelings and thanks to them he is capable of living in society. Feelings bind us to the world, and to man, they bind us to everything that surrounds us. (Enfantin, Bazard, Rodrigues 1953, 226) Aristotle advocated extermination or the suppression of lust, passion, instinct, and interest because he knew very well that the power of movement and life came from them, but that the task of the mind is to lead them correctly and maintain the middle (Pažanin 1973, 32, 289). In man exist dark instincts of his nature that can occur in different forms: as pathological lust and animal frenzy for sensory pleasures, hidden hatred, impulse for destruction and self-destruction, hidden evil, fear, feelings of sin, and guilt.³ According to Seneca, the term conscience means the knowledge of beings or otherwise stated the knowledge of the motivation of our actions, as well as the knowledge of ourselves (Mantzanas 2020, 76).

Jung mentions the archetype of "two brothers", which finds its symbolic expression in the biblical figures of Cain and Abel, while the figure of Christ in psychological sense represents Selbst, i.e. a projection of that central archetype. Hence Christ's words have such great suggestive power, because they express symbolic truths contained in the archetypal psychological structure of man (Jung 1958). Pascal quotes the prayer of Christ on the cross for his enemies, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." He calls it a superfluous request, if the circumstance that they were not conscious of what they had done deprived the act of its taint of evil since in that case it would not need to be forgiven. In the same way, he quotes the view of Aristotle, who draws a distinction between the agent who is *ουκείδως* (misunderstood) and one who is *αγνωων* (unknown). In the first case, the agent acts involuntarily, the lack of knowledge having to do with external circumstances, and is thus not responsible for the act. But with regard to the other case, Aristotle says, "No bad man really knows what should be done and left undone, and it is this lack which makes him unjust and evil. Ignorance of the choice between good and evil does not make an act involuntary or the agent irresponsible, but only makes the act bad." Aristotle has indeed a deeper insight into the connection of knowing and willing than is in vogue in the superficial philosophy, which teaches that ignorance, feeling, and inspiration are the truest principles of ethical conduct (Hegel 2001, 274).

Jealousy is an emotion by which one can measure a man's intelligence, character, and moral feelings. Aristotle pointed out that we are the most pained by something that we consider the most valuable - the lover is the most pained when his love is ignored. Spinoza insisted that jealousy is seen as a moral deficiency, which can be described as a concern when one enjoys his achievement and keeps it. This hatred towards an object of love joined with envy is called jealousy, which accordingly is nothing else but a wavering the disposition arising from combined love and hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied (Spinoza 1972, 263-264).

What this omnipresence of jealousy points toward is its status not as a standpoint, thought, or even feeling that reacts to specific events but as an all-consuming mood (in the Heideggerian sense of *Stimmung*). At the same time, it is clearly the dark side of the most intense of inner conditions: that of love (Ferguson 2017, 225). Hatred towards the object of love will be greater, in proportion to the pleas-

³ It is necessary to have strength, internal, higher strength, to resist your dark impulses. Therefore, do not let the fear of losing a loved one be greater than the excitement of your victory. [Miroslav Krleža, *Gospoda Glembajevi*, (Beograd: Prosveta 1982), 39]. There are laws of nature in the world and a person must live and do everything according to them. [Vukan Slavković, "Conspiratorial myth as a specific phenomenon of social awareness", *Journal of the Belarusian State University. Philosophy and Psychology*, no. 1 (2022): 60].

ure which the jealous man had been wonted to derive from the reciprocated love of the said object; and also, in proportion to the feelings he had previously entertained towards his rival. If he had hated him, he will forthwith hate the object of his love, because he conceives it is pleasurable affected by one whom he himself hates (Spinoza 1972, 264).

It may be possible to explain the ambiguity by reference to a shift in emphasis: what we are now said to be jealous of is no longer good to be protected; rather, we pick out as the ‘object’ of this type of jealousy that which is the focus of the person’s other-directed hostility. The ambiguity can then be accounted for by pointing out that the person feeling jealous will feel hostile toward both the other persons involved, though the hostility will be of a different kind in each case. As Spinoza points out, the loved object, having shown himself to be unreliable, may equally be the focus of hostility (Taylor 1988, 239).

A jealous person is compelled to associate the image of his loved one with the image of him whom he hates. This condition generally comes into play in the case of love for a woman: for he who thinks, that a woman whom he loves prostitutes herself to another, will feel pain, not only because his own desire is restrained, but also because being compelled to associate the image of her he loves with the parts of shame of another, he therefore shrinks from her.⁴A jealous man is not greeted by his beloved with the same joyful countenance as before, and this also gives him pain as a lover (Spinoza 1972, 264-265).

There are people in this world who love and those who don’t want it or are indifferent to others. It is always an actual question – whether jealousy is a passion that should be completely despised (ignored) or justified if it is moderated and used for certain purposes. According to Aristotle, being indignant is in some way opposed to feeling pain at undeserved misfortune, and being pained at undeserved good fortune arises from the same moral character as does pity, and both emotions are characteristic of a good character. For it is right to sympathize with and pity those who suffer undeservedly and to feel indignation at those who [undeservedly] fare well; for what takes place contrary to deserts is unjust. But it might seem that envy [*phthonos*] is also opposed to feeling pity in the same way, as being closely related and much the same thing as being indignant; and yet it is different. Envy is both agitated pain and directed at success, but of an equal and alike rather than of someone who is unworthy (Aristotle 2007, 142).

In the *Eudemian Ethics*, “nemesi” is a mean, and is said to cover four emotions: pain at undeserved good or bad fortune (indignation and pity), pleasure at deserved good or bad fortune (‘happy for’ and ‘pleasure at deserved misfortune’). The excessive vice is “phthonos”, which is described as a pain felt at deserved good fortune (envy); the defective vice is unnamed but is felt by the “epichairekakos” and is a joy at undeserved misfortune (spite). In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, “nemesi” is again the mean, and thus a morally acceptable emotion, providing it is felt only when the object’s good fortune is undeserved (righteous indignation, what Aristotle calls “nemesi” in the *Rhetoric*). “Phthonos” is once again identified with an excess of indignation, feeling pain even when good fortune is deserved (envy); and this time the defective vice, being so far short of pain that one feels joy (presumably at undeserved bad fortune), is named as “epichairekakia” (spite) (Sanders 2014, 65-66). In Plato’s *Philebus*, Socrates says that envy causes pleasure in the misfortunes of friends. When we laugh at what is ridiculous in friends, in introducing the element of pleasure into envy, we do in effect blend together this pleasure with pain; since it reminds us that it was some time ago agreed, that envy was a mental pain, and that laughing was a pleasure; and thus that these two feelings were produced in us together at those particular times (Plato 1873, 83).

According to Plutarch, enviers eye more jealously those who enjoy a reputation for goodness, feeling that they possess the greatest blessing and virtue; and even if they receive some benefit from the fortunate, are tormented envying them for both the intention and the power. For the intention proceeds from their virtue, the power from their good fortune, and both are blessings. It is therefore quite distinct from hate, if what soothes the one torments and embitters the other (Plutarch 1959, 107).

Jealous delusion

⁴ According to the Greek saga of Periander of Corinth and his wife, Melissa, who was killed by him out of jealousy, the tyrant summoned the ghost of his warmly beloved wife and asked for some sign of recognition, which she proved, reminding him that he “had put loave into a cold oven”, referring to an event that could not be known to any other person. (Herodot, *Istorija 1. i 2. deo*, (Novi Sad: Matica srpska, 1988), 186.

Law finds its connection in many sciences, especially in philosophy from which it is originated (Hasanbegović 2005,10). Interest in jealousy in law is boundless, so in judicial practice, because it is necessary for resolving the issues of responsibility for crimes committed on the basis of these motives and its prevention, for individualizing of criminal responsibility and punishment, as well as for determining the circumstances that enable the commission of a crime (SlavkoJvić 2020, 80). In most cases, murders related to the relationship between a man and a woman are committed because of erotic jealousy.⁵ It represents a complex of mental suffering during the actual or apparent deception of a loving person and it is characterized by a complex psychological structure, emotional reactions, and states (envy, hatred, concern, despair, thirst for revenge, passion, etc.) disturbing suspicions, complex expressions in the intellectual and voluntaristic sphere, various forms of behavior, often socially dangerous, including murder (Borodin 2003, 102–103).

The individual seeking revenge holds himself to be the essential concern in opposition to the violator and seeks to restore his injured existence through the destruction of the wrongdoer. But the concern in punishment is a quite different one, namely, with a violation of law. The countereffect of the penalty is not a mere consequence of the violation, rather it belongs to the very essence of the misdeed. The misdeed as a crime demands punishment, which is to say that it does not have the immediacy of a simple action, but rather exists in the form of universality as a crime *per se*. Punishment as inversion (Verkehrtheit) plainly implies that punishment has an essential tie to the misdeed. Punishment is reasonable. The wrongdoer, as the reasonable man he wants to be, must turn against himself (Gadamer 1976, 50).

Psychiatrists distinguish between normal jealousy, overvalued ideas of jealousy („überwertige Idee“, the expression first used by C. Wernicke), and jealous delusion. While investigating the crime of murder, it is necessary to explain the character of jealousy. In the last two cases, it may turn out that the person caused someone’s death due to mental incompetence (Borodin 2003, 102-103). According to the International Classification of Diseases 11th Revision, a delusion is a belief that is demonstrably untrue or not shared by others, usually based on incorrect inference about external reality. The belief is firmly held with conviction and is not, or is only briefly, susceptible to modification by experience or evidence that contradicts it. The belief is not ordinarily accepted by other members of the person’s culture or subculture (i.e., it is not an article of religious faith). ICD-11 defines “Jealous delusion” (MB26.0) as a delusion that one’s sexual partner is unfaithful. “Overvalued ideas” (MB26) are unreasonable and sustained beliefs that are maintained with less than delusional intensity (i.e., the person is able to acknowledge the possibility that the belief may not be true). An alternative use of this term is to refer to conventional or plausible thoughts (e.g., religious concepts, political ideas, or excessively idealistic beliefs) that are held with such a level of intensity so that the person’s life is taken up by them.⁶ Overvalued ideas, being emotionally very intense, occupy the central place in the psyche and bother a man to be sufficiently impartial and objective in his opinions (Zavilianskii, Bleikher 1989, 112). In severe cases, the impression is distinctly given that the jealous individual cannot rest because he has no confidence in peaceful happiness on account of his misfortune (Adler 1999, 182).

G. Huber and G. Gross believe that so far, synthesis of different directions in the study of delusions has not been achieved, while they subject existing directions to criticism as unsatisfactory. The difficulties, which were examined during the delimitation between normal and pathological jealousy, were also explained. They are conditioned on insufficiently known “fictic circumstances” (“actual situation”), there is a lack of clear boundaries between normal and pathological jealousy and even, on the contrary, it is examined the supposedly clear link and similarity between them (Gross, Huber 1986, 50–59).

⁵ The Code of Visigoths (Book III, Title IV, Article 6.) obliged the slaves to tie up in front of her husband a woman they would find in adultery; her children (Article 13) were allowed to accuse her and put her slaves in torment to prove her guilt. (Vukan Slavković, *Conatus delicti: korak ka zločinu*, op. cit. 40). Also, Visigoths gave adulteress as a slave to the wife of a man with whom she made adultery (Kazimierz Imieliński, *Medicina i seks*, (Beograd, Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, 2005), 82.

⁶ “ICD-11”, accessed January 22, 2022,

<https://icd.who.int/browse11/l-m/en/#/http://id.who.int/icd/entity/932028588>

Such “integration of paranoid behaviour” with external circumstances is based only on the superficial similarity of delusion and certain psychological phenomena, and this must be taken into account during the scientific approach in studying delusion. The ascertainment of substantial similarity between some phenomena needs allowance of similarity of causes conditioning them. Nevertheless, from this aspect, it is completely wrong to talk about the similarities of delusion and mental distress of psychologically healthy people, if psychologically understandable is only the content of delusion, but not its origin. Delusion cannot be linked to real facts, neither in positive nor in negative sense.

In psychiatry, there are attitudes about arising of delusion on a pathological basis, pointing to mental illness⁷, and with noting that delusions arise from the wrong beliefs of patients, with high subjective assurance in their veracity. Nevertheless, that definition requires reconsideration (Schulte, Tölle 1977, 136-137). The pathological basis of the origin of delusions is indisputable. It may be the result of the effects of psychological factors, i.e. regression in the early stage of development and reactivation of primitive mechanisms of defense that lead to deep internal insecurity (as a source of very unpleasant feelings) to the outside, which creates delusions. In this way, the person “protects” himself from deeper internal disintegration because it is much easier for him to experience the source of danger as something from the outside than inside him (Kecmanović 1989, 57–59).

Conclusion

The interpretation of jealousy based on socio-psychological factors has a long history. Ancient Greek philosophers had a special fondness for mythology, while today’s man takes mythological symbols too concretely so that he wonders when he encounters numerous contradictions in them because one archetypal symbol can simultaneously have different meanings. The archetype of “two brothers”, found its symbolic expression in the biblical figures of Cain and Abel, while the figure of Christ in the psychological sense represents Selbst, i.e. a projection of that central archetype. Hence Christ’s words have such great suggestive power because they express symbolic truths contained in the archetypal psychological structure of man. The words of God, like “Fret not yourself” or “Withhold your hand from crime” refer that historical consciousness acts as a value judgment and motivational factor, which is important for the formation and behaviour of man as a social being.

Human actions derive from different characters, but also from various approaches to jealousy. The deepest basis of social instincts in man is not reason, but feelings. The emotion of anger, depicted in the phenomenon of jealousy, occurs when a man feels that all his attempts to regain the attention of a significant object, love, and sense of security have become unsuccessful. In man exist dark instincts of his nature that can occur in different forms. In most cases, murders related to the relationship between a man and a woman are committed because of erotic jealousy. It represents a complex of mental suffering during the actual or apparent deception of a loving person and it is characterized by a complex psychological structure, emotional reactions and states.

Historical phenomena and processes in society can be explained and therefore understood by knowledge of the theory of philosophy, and psychology and with appreciation of the logic of historical cognition. Only reasonable knowledge is able to free man from both the effects of his own passions and external causes, which inhibit his being. Therefore, as a basic moral task which is placed before man is

⁷ According to E. V. Terentev, the pathological basis of the arising of delusion not implies mental illness in a broader sense, but the pathological impact of opinion conditioned by certain but not known, cerebral damage, brain substrate damage, “internal specifics of the brain” of patients. (Evgenii Iosifovich Terentev, *Bred revnosti* (Moskva: Meditsina, 1991), 43-44). The first convincing conception linking emotions to the functions of certain brain structures was published in 1937 and its author is J. Papez. By studying emotional disorders in cases of patients with damage of hippocampus and *cingulate gyrus*, he set a hypothesis about the existence of a unique system, which unites a range of brain structures and forms a brain substrate for emotions. (“Нейроанатомия эмоций. Структурная основа эмоций”, Accessed February 20, 2022, <https://olegchagin.livejournal.com/3178586.html>). The *cingulate gyrus* is an integral part of the limbic system, which is directly responsible for motivation, emotional behavior (autonomous and sexual functions), memory processes and it is a region of connectivity (interface) between attention and emotions (Goran Spasojevic et. al. “Digitalna morfometrijska studija ekstrasulkusne površine Girus-a cinkuli čoveka”. *Medicinski pregled* 63 no. 1-2 (2010): 51.

to use true knowledge to overcome and defeat his affects, i.e. to replace vague and inadequate ideas of imagination with clear, talkable, and adequate ideas of reason.

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