

Abstract: Social Philosophy is a discipline that deals with social behaviour and interprets society and its institutions according to ethical values instead of empirical relations. Bearing this in mind, I decided to explore the phenomenon of the crisis regarding the modern ethos of postmodern culture in the context of the history of classical philosophy. I have done so by relating it to new theoretical and epistemological frameworks of social, philosophical ontology on the one hand, and to the attempt to find an appropriate linguistic paradigm through philosophical semantics on the other hand that would have the potential to create an alternative ethical category. The ultimate goal is to show that philosophy becomes philosophy through the human being himself.

Keywords: truth, ontology, language, suffering as pain in being

«Люди станут жить лучше только тогда когда они сами станут лучше, а для этого есть лишь один путь – каждому стать лучше.»/ People will live better only then, when they become better by themselves, and to accomplished this, there is only one way – every one of them to become better by themselves “ – Л.Толстой / L. Tolstoy

It is an indisputable historical fact that the Russian language has acquired extraordinary lexical wealth over an entire millennium. However, when we talk about the way of acquisition, we certainly do not mean the mediated peace process for the development of a civi-

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zation ex cathedra. We rather think of a peculiar way of “acquisition” that the Gospel testifies to: *Enter ye in by the narrow gate, for wide is the gate, and broad is the way, that leadeth to destruction, and many be they that enter in thereby* and *Strive to enter in by the narrow door* (the Gospel according to St. Luke 1991: 13:24). These statements have been taken from an extremely concretized context in which biblical exegesis, literary hermeneutics and philosophical paradigm intersect as a prototype, a pattern, or an example from which they derive, or an example derived from it, right from the very precious paradigm of its own. All this could only mean that the lexical diversity arises from the equally peculiar cryptophilosophical existentialism in which language is placed, its historical tremors, the constant existential spasm, or quite the opposite – its spread as a shot through the field that has not yet been deterritorialized, being composed of symbols that enter neither exegetically nor hermeneutically. Their recoding is performed with the paradigmatic key of philosophy. The phrase in its two variations: *Strive to enter* and *Enter through a narrow door*, shows the dialectical connection between the state of pre-listening as an act preceding the very entrance, which in itself is a kind of struggle – *Strive to enter*, and the act of happening – *Enter through a narrow door* (Bible, New Testament), as a follow-up act, since language reflects the existential drama of the being called to fight as a prelude in the subsequent phrase. That phrase, in the word “enter” itself, is a kind of synonym, a struggle within the constant sequence of the word – *to enter through a narrow door*, whose purpose is not to miss rather than to miss to enter through it itself. In this way, one can interpret Tolstoy’s thought, a thought in which the same dialectic within the linguistic expression, the linguistic expression that has a basic purpose, as a pre-existing rumble; in Tolstoy’s thought, and in every thought that has been thought since the time of the primordial, the time of genesis (being), referring to the ultimate goal – the thought is called to produce meaning.

In that sense, the question of being, and of man in general, can be considered in a condition of distress, and that state can only be manifested in the metaphysical assumptions of interpretation itself

in the ontology of the word, for example, of virtue in man and virtue as a state in which man finds himself guessed rather than explained by Tolstoy, and hence the philosophical paradigm of the existence of inner life in the very word embodied in the Russian verb in its perfect and imperfect forms: *стать* and *станут* (*will become* and *become*). However, Tolstoy set the goal of “becoming better” as a condition that is philosophical in principle – man himself to be/become better. As a part of our task to define man in the future and philosophy as a despised science of the post-Christian civilization of the Occident, it becomes extremely complicated to establish namely those frameworks that would be limited only to linguistics or philosophy, or to be more precise, to build a firm and fixed position for the two alternatives, whether semantics as the subdiscipline of general linguistics that defines language as a system of signs becomes philosophy on the one hand, or philosophy itself in its nature possesses a semantic code through which it decodes, i.e. structures its frameworks in which it realizes its own philosophical practice on the other hand. Thus, in the code of the word itself, interception occurs as an action, and the point as a punctuation mark at the meeting of the action of semantics which, meeting philosophy, will no longer remain the same. From the science of signs, semantics becomes a kind of theory of cognition and a branch of symbolic logic. However, in order to crystallize the meaning as a reference object of semantics, by the fact that meaning is objectified/materialized, the meaning comes out of the communication channel, and the link “mark–marked” (“tag–tagged”) becomes (*стать* and *станут* – author’s note) an object/being or way of existence through the Logos/logical connections of the subject himself who contemplates the object as an object, as a reality...

Hence, it becomes essentially necessary to determine the point of what was once a punctuation mark, and consequently a mark in the ontology of the being of truth, turning to another variant of subjective idealism and to the ontology of the person understood as the Logos of knowledge/meaning. On the other hand, the subjective idealism in Schopenhauer’s variant of the complete renunciation of the “thing or being in itself” as Kant’s critique of the existence of the object in-

dependent of the subject, has led to a complete philosophical-ethical marasmus, a decay of the human will to a blind instinct and a reckless pursuit which, according to the notion of the existence of the object through the subject, will eventually turn into an extremely pessimistic conclusion, a kind of pre-existential pessimism before the formal historical existentialism, the “conclusion” that evil is the essence of life and therefore suffering and pain are the inevitable cause-and-effect fate of that same knowledge. On the other hand, the problem of being is the basis of the whole philosophy of Martin Heidegger, but also of Jean Paul Sartre. Especially here, it is important to point out an essential feature in Heidegger’s philosophy, which is his anthropological ontology where he places all the drama of existence, especially the one referring to fear (Angst) as a state of self-loss in relation to other people. As for Sartre, he has developed Heidegger’s ontological anthropology, especially in the part where Heidegger opposes the ontology of fear to the idea of freedom. The most essential part refers to the connection of being and nothingness. Heidegger defines nothingness as a crack in the body of being making it the same being – transient. Sartre’s definition differs in the part where nothingness does not create depth in being, but primacy over being because man will become a being for himself only after death. However, he cannot exhaust his self because he ceases to be what he was. These indicative examples from the history of philosophy point to the need for philosophy to find its starting point, the above point that can be put into being as a white paper, radically changing the interpretation of its morphology.

If we return to the totality of the thought, the statement of L. H. Tolstoy, the existence of several mutually and dialectically conditioned parts can be observed. The most obvious conditionality seems to be in the second part of the sentence, conditionality transferred in the singular, which in turn depends on the decision made on a personal level, which widely opens the gate for paradigmatic interpretation of the statement and its placement in the order of subjective idealism. On the other hand, the success of subjective realism depends on the hermeneutic undertaking in interpreting the final syntagm – *каждому стать лучше / everyone to get/become better*, whose internal seman-

tic resonances, each of which, no matter how insignificant and to the slightest nuance, still brings drama in the ontology of the expression itself. More precisely, it points out in different ways that the being is self-realized in the world as opposed to other beings. For example, if this final phrase is interpreted from Tolstoy's statement as a condition for the world to become better, provided that everyone gets better, it points to a way of manifesting the being in the world, and if he himself becomes better, it indicates a completely different way of manifesting the same being in the same world.

The first hermeneutic way of decrypting the mystery of existence – goodness as an anthropologically supreme phenomenon and as a poetically sublimated figure, and ethos as the original philosophical, epistemological and esoteric paradigm, points to goodness outside the self's desire for the subject. The second nuanced variation – to become better, means that goodness springs from the ontology of the human subjective self, or the manifestation of goodness is first performed in being as an invisible, inner existential performance, and only then it is embodied in the external objective world given to everyone to fulfill that same task in the external existential performance of life, or to become better as the trembling of being as a constant inner dialectics between “to be” and “to become”, and of being as an internal Logos of the existence of different contents in itself...

In this sense, Oleg Drobnicki makes a visible distinction between ethos in the Socratic philosophy in Greece and in his philosophical conception in his book *Understanding Morality*. Linguistic-paradigmatic terms are included where the phenomenon of ethos is closely related to the understanding of the cosmos itself, which in turn is a natural and historical relationship according to the stage of the development of philosophy itself.

The phenomenon of life and its meaning, as well as of human behaviour in that context, have not been studied or recognized beyond the boundaries of the nature of the cosmos itself, and in the consciousness of the ancient Hellenes. A term that was close to the cosmos was the term Logos (Λόγος), but as a valuable criterion that explained the degree of orderliness of the cosmos, a degree of orderliness that

followed the ancient Πόλης. From this it can be concluded that in the first stage of the development of philosophy, cosmogony and myth, each within its scope imprinted its traces in the area that was yet to be born, i.e. myth and cosmogony have laid the foundations of an area that, in his time, he will be able to break away from his pre-philosophical predecessors. Philosophy could not have developed in this recognizable form in the last 2,500 years without a material from which to separate itself. That material are myth and cosmogony. Since mythos is a story that aims to guess, not to tell, how all things came into being, that myth had to use language. Namely, traces of the ethos itself could be sought here, particularly in the creation of lexical synonyms, for example, whether Πόλης and Κόσμος could denote a single term, and whether the same equation is possible in the relation between ηθικός and Δίκη – the goddess of justice and truth...

When all these four notions are correlated with each other, the question arises of whether the notion, more specifically the being marked by different linguistic derivatives, determines the meaning which is a kind of a blow against the category *cogito*, i.e. the radically new position that the beginning is connected with Λόγος, and not with the Κοσμος created by him, and then, as a kind of reverse transcendence, and Πόλης as a mimetic echo of the previous creation or cosmogony. This thesis can be confirmed in the views of Drobnicki, especially in his review of the term Κοσμοπολίτικος (Дробницкий 1974: p. 25) to point out to the Stoics and Epicureans and their insistence to connect the person who professes wisdom with this term. What is essential for this article is what Drobnicki himself noted, but did not connect most directly with the use of the semantics of language and linguistic construction. This means that, according to them, morality can be directly derived from the cosmogony Λόγος. This remark has its basis, and it can be found in the Greek noun form Κοσμο (or people) as well as in the term Κόσμος which contains an ambiguity: order, structure, but also jewelry and ornament. This points to an even subtler source from which the phenomena of goodness and beautifulness arise, and that the very source is the Λόγος.

Philosophical semantics

Continuing in the same order, using conditionality as the primary impetus for the manifestation of being in the world as the primary impulse of philosophy itself, the path to understanding one's own self-deprecation of philosophy opens up the possibilities for a different linguistic, semiological and paradigmatic endeavour.

In this context, the conditionality of the philosophy of language causes philosophical-linguistic causality, which would only mean that if linguistic semantics studies the meaning of words from natural spoken (living) languages, then philosophical semantics would emerge as a separate branch of symbolic logic. However, the symbol should be reached primarily in what Aristotle calls the *poetics tech* / ποιητική τέχνη in his *Poetics*, which would mean that symbolic logic primarily refers to some other, pictorial aspects produced by language itself. This would mean that in order to answer the provocative theme of philosophy and the future of man, perhaps it would be more useful to seek not in the future, but on the contrary – in the past, and not in man, but somewhere else because, in this case, right anthropology should be given priority as a socio-humanistic discipline that studies man, unlike philosophical anthropology as a branch of philosophy par excellence.

In particular, this means that, instead of man, formal logic and its perspectives emerge in the foreground as a humanistic discipline that has singled out its own object of study since the dawn of its history, and that is the contemplation as such.

Consequently, the answer to the question concerning the future of philosophy should be sought in its history, particularly in the self-development of philosophy through time divided into stages, and in the context of the given topic – recognizing the moment when the thin line between prehistory and history of philosophy is crossed. Thus, this discovery causes a unique recognition of the thin line between mythology and its pantheistic matrix for contemplating the relationship between one human being and another, between the human and the world, and, finally, between anthropomorphic human-like

creatures to which the ancient man of the time ascribed divine, demi-urgic, cosmogonic, and eschatological perspectives and features. On the opposite side of the thin line of demarcation, on the other side of the mythological conception, or the beginning of philosophy, stands the teaching of being. That science will make the much-needed distance from the mythological and cosmogonic worldview as a way of thinking by taking an inward trajectory, a breakthrough inward and a flash outward. In a sense, philosophy in its early stages created its own dialectics, becoming aware through the Ionian philosophers, its antecedent representatives, that there was a connection between the inner world of man and the outer world of his surroundings.

The twentieth century in particular has brought linguists and philosophers closer to the challenge of forming a common theory of signs. In his book *Introduction to Semantics*, the German-American philosopher and logician Rudolf Carnap makes some kind of a revision of the position of equating philosophy with the logical syntax of language. He approaches truth as a term in which different things are “read” or “understood”. However, this philosopher and linguist opened the possibility of creating his own logic on the question of what signs would be operated on the basis of some given rules. On the other hand, in his semantic theory of truth, the Polish-American mathematician and logician Alfred Tarski approaches truth as a term in which different things are able to be “read” or “understood”. He refers to sentences as physical objects, but does not deny their psychological effect, especially thinking of judgments and beliefs, bringing his theory into the space of Plato’s ideas, namely sentences and words as portable universal ideal essences.

Tarski used certain phraseological expressions, phrases of the type “true love” or “true friendship” and their effect on the so-called declarative sentences, concluding that they express metaphysical domains. With the ultimate goal of avoiding metaphysics, he proposed that the definition of truth be always associated with a particular language, or something that postmodernists would later call a type of discourse, mainly because the sentence construction in one language

can express or mark truth in a different way, and in another language, at the same time, truth can be shown to be false.

This is where the position on the question of the future of man is built. In fact, it becomes causal – consequential with philosophy. As for the question of the exact place of philosophy and man in this syntagma, or whether philosophy, in the time to come, will be a cause or a consequence in the future of man, maybe it would be most appropriate to refer to Friedrich Engels and his book *Anti-Dühring*:

*Is human opinion sovereign? Before answering with yes or no, we are obliged to examine what is human opinion. Is it the opinion of the individual man? No. But does that exist as the opinion of many billions of past, present and **future people**? If I say now: this opinion of all those people, including the future people, which I have included in my play, **is sovereign** and is able to know the present world. If humanity will exist long enough and if that knowledge does not set limits in the organs and objects of knowledge, then I have said something that is very trivial... According to Mr. Dühring himself, the fact that consciousness, and therefore contemplation and knowledge, can only occur through separate beings, is only a necessity.*

To the opinion of each of these individuals we can attribute sovereignty only if we do not know any force capable of that opinion, when it is in a healthy and awake state, to forcibly impose any thought on any of these individuals... (Engels 1960: pp. 112–114).

In the case with Tarski, it is impossible not to comprehend and acknowledge his intuition on the one hand, and the formal logical construction on the other hand. The problem with his antiplatonism is that it stands unilaterally on the semantic-signifying function of language, thus avoiding Platonic synthetics, or to be more precise, Plato's ability to connect the essences of ideas through language by creating philosophical paradigms and symbols.

Here lies the root of that neuralgic point, the comparison according to the principle “the similarity produces the similar” cannot but to be noticed and compared with Friedrich Engels's *Anti-Dühring*:

Truth and delusion, like all logical categories that move in polar opposites, apply absolutely to a very limited area... As soon as we

apply the opposition between truth and delusion outside the narrow field we have outlined above, it becomes relative, and therefore unusable for accurate scientific expression; and if we try to apply it outside that area as something that is absolutely valid, then our failure is complete, both opposites are transformed into each other, truth becomes delusion, and delusion becomes truth... (Engels 1960: p. 119).

All this leads to the awareness that the rigid formalism of the interpretation of certain syntagmatic units leads to relativism, for the simple reason that formalism overemphasizes the semantic role of language in signifying and exhausting objective reality at the expense of the paradigmatic function of language for creating/ discovering/ exhausting worlds of ideas, or penetration into the territory of symbols that are brought to life through language, creating/discovering new worlds, such as the questions of what is an idea and what is the way to the idea – in Plato:

[...] something that is first, eternal, and that neither occurs, nor decays, nor multiplies, nor disappears; then, which is beautiful on the one hand and ugly on the other; to be beautiful today, and not tomorrow; neither towards this beautiful, nor towards that ugly; nice here too, and there – ugly as if it were only nice for some, ugly for others. Another thing, that beauty will not be shown to him as a face, nor as hands, nor as anything else that belongs to the body; neither as a speech, nor as knowledge, nor as something contained in something else, be it in a living being, or on earth, or in heaven, or in anything else, but as something that is only after self and self-homogeneous and eternal (Plato 1979: pp. 86–87).

The urge of the twentieth century to avoid any possibility of metaphysical speculation, in the case of Tarski, in his urge to keep philosophy within the physical and logical syntax of language “sub specialis“ in relation to the term “truthfulness”, Tarski, by calling it a term, in fact, from the word “truthfulness”, derived all its etymological, according to the origin, transcendent features, more precisely, all neoplatonic subjective idealism, therefore, as the basis of its formal-logical (de)construction of the term “truth”, refers to Aristotle’s definition of truth: *truth consists in coincidence, agreement between*

thought and reality. It is fascinating that Tarski did not find even this formulation adequate. So, he tried to remove these “flaws” by creating a formula that would define it as a materialistic criterion of the term “truth”. For example, *X is true only if R, as the location of X where the name of the corresponding sentence should be, represents the very same corresponding sentence* (Tarski 1949: p. 71). Tarski believed that the conjunction plays a major role in establishing the truth, but he also believed that truth can only be achieved if a strict formalization of the language is carried out, as well as a division of the subject language versus the metalanguage, i.e. the language of objective reality corresponds to reality, for example: that the wall is white and the language is used as a statement of that real condition, and in the second example, when that same statement is used in a sentence construction, which is internalized within its structure, in its own internal verbal and phonetic composition. In that case, language is no longer an external, reflective manifestation of the corresponding reality, but rather the internal morphosyntactic sequence of words.

The very division of metalanguage and the language of objective reality is an important issue for philosophy itself because, within the linguistic construction, there is a crack in the signifying being of the language itself, a crack that is relativized **primarily because language draws conclusions and does not reach the fullness of the being of truth, and on the other hand, its internal generic structure which is composed of unmanifested potential signifiers of different truths, potentials that can, but are not obliged to manifest, or to manifest only a certain number of them. But even with that, those potential signifiers of truth, in essence, exhaust the truth as a conclusion. Exhausting the truth, that same truth ceases to exist, and thus its meaning as such ceases.**

However, it should be noted that Tarski was not entirely consistent when he spoke of a strict formalist and materialist criterion of truth. He used terminological constructions that go beyond the boundaries of the object of his research and interest, such as language. The term “metalanguage” is a kind of symbol used when one language gives statements about another one as a language of objective reali-

ty. Grammar itself can also be treated as a type of discourse, or as a metalanguage that describes the very nature of language. In any case, a major stumbling block is the symbol which is formally interpreted as a poetic stylistic device in literary theory. In a paradigmatic sense, however, the symbol is a pictorial representation of what Plato himself defined as an idea that reflects essence or principle from which things arise. In the name of that same consistency, Tarski's book is called *Semantic Conception of Truth*, or, according to the trajectory set by Tarski himself, a concept of truth by way of the sign structure of language, **but not truth itself that contains its own ontology**.

In Slavic languages, the etymology of words can find a way out of the labyrinth in which 20th-century semiotics found itself. For example, according to Tarski's formal morphological criterion, the word "truth" (вистина, истина, istina) is a noun, but when it acquires a syntactic function, it activates its internal etymological potential. This means that a word, in addition to the formal morphological criterion, also contains non-formal, non-morphological domains in its internal structure that trigger completely different perceptions – primarily paradigmatic ones. In the Slavic world, the word "truth" (вистина, истина, istina), using semiotics as a significant analysis of the word, refers to a two-sided meaning: the first, formal, semantic truth is what is the same; and the second truth, which refers to ontology, **is what it is, or what it stands for, or what is not falling as a truth**. This points to a higher supra-epistemological and dialectical awareness that even negation is not able to annul the fullness of the being of truth by turning from negation into affirmation (*it does not fall, which consequently means that it stands – author's note*).

As can be seen, both meanings produced by the word "truth" correspond to potential truth. The first potential truth represents the equalization of meaning, or correspondence between the sign and the signified, and produces meaning (and reason in this sense). This confirms Aristotle's conclusion about truth as a coincidence between thought and reality. On the other hand, there is the fact that in the noun "truth" there is a verb in the infinitive (derived from the root of the Slavic word istina/вистина/истина), which in itself points to a

third person. This creates a context for forming a temporal category of the verb, which points to the infinitive (ad infinitum) or to grammatical tenses that do not exist in the memorial treasure of grammar to denote it formally – the physical category of time (tenses). In that case, **semantic connotations cannot be drawn. They simply have to (re)move to a new, non-semantic level, and that is how a word, in addition to literary theoretical paradigms, also creates philosophical categories.** The very presence of the third person in the verb indicates the presence of at least one more subject if that verb is in the singular, which means that the first person singular speaks of another person who is neither *I* (1st person) nor *you* (2nd person), but a third one who is not obliged to be personally present in the narrative procedure.

Hence, things become complex, creating a complex context for formal grammatical and paradigmatic categorical knowledge. They should be shaped and placed in a single framework of interpretation and definition, especially when it comes to the person who carries along paradigmatic features, such as self, ontology as the existence of his being that is reflected in contextual circumstances in them. The understanding of speech is written by the listener – the addressee of the rhetoric act. According to Tarski, *we can accept the semantic conception of truth without rejecting any epistemological view of knowledge; we can remain naive realists, empiricists or metaphysicians – everything we used to be. Semantic theory is completely neutral to all these questions* (Tarski 1940: p. 63).

The weakness of formalism lies in the attempt to present truth as what, which is the same. In equating philosophy with the logical syntax of language, it proves to be an unsuccessful endeavour as to the etymology of the word “truth” in Slavic languages. Truth as what exists further points to the spectral semantic possibilities of language, but with one colossal note – those spectral possibilities of language become possible only when **linguistics does not lead and does not move against philosophy.** Also, there is the view that truth cannot be an attribute of a sentence because the latter is a mere stacking of sounds that are then shaped into voices that make sense but not truth

because truth depends on the way thought is shaped in judging whether that same thought corresponds to reality as truth or does not correspond to reality as a lie. This attitude is problematic because of the potential that language carries, such as the return pronoun as the carrier of ontological potential (self), or the verb as the carrier of existential potential (being). In this context, Aristotle's theory is both correct and incorrect. The fact that this is so does not represent a contradiction at all that should cause the creation of an ontological abyss between the two views or to withdraw such a recognizable philosophical dualism of the type "idea-matter" or "existence-essence". Aristotle's theory is correct because there must be an agreement between thought and reality, but also between the potentials of the word that must produce meaning, and the reality that can accept that thought according to Slavic etymology as a bearer of the same sense (*с-мисла, с-мисао/s-misao, смисъл etc.; the prefix 's' profoundly changes the noun from "thought" into "sense" – author's note*). In the Slavic world, the so-called meaning, containing the noun "thought" in its foundation, is established both morphologically and semantically. The prefix 's' in the Slavic word dramatically changes the whole ontology of the word itself. Added to the basic line of the word "thought", the modest prefix is read phonetically only as a supplement to another voiced consonant, but ontologically there is an internal reconfiguration of the meaning of the word, so that it could very easily find its own pair, match, or homonym in the world of the lexicon as meaning or reason. Therefore, the question of truth inevitably leads in a direction that Tarski did not like, and that is objective idealism.

Of course, this formula can be applied to Plato. The phenomenon of ideas as bearers of essences fits too easily into the mosaic of invisible yet existing potentials, but reality itself is also capable of changing the potential of the idea, to accept or reject it. Therefore, the basic problem of philosophical semantics is the supremacy of semiotics over philosophy. Thus, the old philosophy came under attack only because the escape from metaphysics opened Pandora's box to the question of whether spirit or matter is dominant, to problems about the essence of things and its manifestations, to objective legality, to

the reality of the world and its existence depending on the senses or not, and so on.

On the other hand, correct linguistic formulations suppressed philosophical reasoning and, in general, dismantled the process of philosophizing as an act of thought par excellence. The question of the exact mathematical distinction and mechanical separation of subject language versus metalanguage has turned syntax into logical syntax, and logical semantics into a method of suppressing earlier forms of antinomies originating from the old Cartesian tradition of philosophy. The attempt to create a monopoly on language rejected the ontology and the question of self in linguistic constructions in which there was simply no place for this type of linguists. So, truth began to be placed above all logical, convincing euphemisms, such as in Carnap's books *Logical Foundations of Probability* and *Meaning and Necessity*. From the ontological fullness of truth, from the perspective of cognition, and even in the field of sensory cognition and empirically given facts about truth, only its formal linguistic framework remains. The question of truth in the dimension of cognition, no matter how radically subjective the same cognition is and how much it does not recognize the objective reality beyond the limits of the subject's cognition, is a question which would mean recognizing the paradigm for the existence of reality beyond the boundaries of current linguistic and semantic potentials, denying the existence of the invisible (existing) potential beyond the visible one as a type of discourse potential in a strictly defined epistemological consciousness. Philosophy is most directly expelled from the reality of the human being where there is no place for the idea as one of the foundations on which philosophy rests. The future of the human being is expelled, tension of overseeing time itself which is formally, but not ontologically called the present, or time that takes place at the moment of speaking. At the same time, it is not entirely clear whether that moment is present and whether it is composed of multiple moments. If it is composed, the question will be whether those moments have incorporated particles from past or future grammatical tenses, or parts of the shattered time of eternity.

In this way, the future of the human being, caught in the trap of living in an impersonal and sterile present, captures that same human being, destroying his ontologically understood freedom (not the freedom that is made in the matrix of linguistic and semiotic mappings of reality) as an example that opposes Carnap's euphemism – meaning and necessity, the comment of the atomist Pseudo-Plutarch on Democritus it may definitely serve:

*Democritus understood the universe as infinite, because no one created it in any way. Moreover, he calls it immutable... The causes of everything that happens now have no beginning; in general, from infinite time onwards; **everything that has happened, what is now and what will be** is contained in advance by “necessity” (Hristovski 1977: p. 249).*

Pseudo-Plutarch's commentary on Democritus fits perfectly into the thesis of philosophical semantics on the problematization of equating philosophy with logical syntax. The present of the modern human being fully corresponds to Democritus's thesis of an uncreated universe that exists for itself and by itself, and that has no own being and self at the same time because the absence of an ontology of the universe presupposes an insoluble contradiction which, without resolving contradiction, becomes a counterweight to truth. The universe as such becomes a lie.

Consequently, the next question arises of whether it is possible for the universe to be infinite and immutable simultaneously. More precisely, how is it possible for the universe to be infinite, and at the same time to be space, for its spaces to remain unchanged because immutability indicates established boundaries, an eternal physiognomy? Hence, if there are boundaries, it means that there has been a movement that has stopped in a space where those boundaries were engraved and drawn. On the other hand, it breaks the theory of the infinity of the universe according to the criterion of space, that the universe is not infinite at all. If it is not infinite, then it has an end, and if there is an end, then the whole theory goes back in order to revise its beginning, which in turn points to another hidden criterion for the eye of Democritus, and that is the factor of time. The universe began in a

cosmic moment which, according to the criterion of necessity, should be called the beginning. On the other hand, this theory of Democritus may be correct if he had in mind another, different, and most importantly *invisible* and yet existing universe which would really be infinite, and which would exist in parallel with the visible universe. Democritus may have meant a multiverse, an infinite number of worlds in space and so on... In this sense, another rhetorical question arises: When could the *logical basis of probability* be applied to the potential truth of Democritus, especially since truth develops a demand to be unique and exhaustive as such, with mechanisms that are more existential than nominal? Therefore, can it be concluded on the level of an axiom that the statement itself, the *logical basis of probability*, is true when and if it does not correspond to, but *coexists* with the *idea of truth*? What is obvious is that the phenomenon of truth is not exhausted by sign equivalences in sentence constructions. For example, the question of time as past, present or future tense which in the grammar of language is posed as natural time. It would basically mean a verb at the moment of speaking that *signifies* the present tense, at some point that ended or started at a previous moment that builds on the present tense would mean the past tense, and the moment to come would denote the future tense.

Heidegger was decisive. He believed that time is not the objective time that beats and is thus signified through the clock, but the one that is essentially related to the human being and his action. Human time is determined by human imagination, undertaken ventures and established projects, and therefore determined by the future, not the past or the present. Heidegger spoke about time that is filled with creative activity and materialized deeds, meaning that such a person fills the void of the endless ordering of moments expressed as the “present(s)” of objective time. In this way, the philosopher built a theory of the future as a basis for the present. As for the past tense, he interpreted it as a time come into its realization, as a former future, as a former idea in the human head that was supposed to be realized and has already been realized.

The philosophical synthesis of time and human activity in modern philosophy corresponds to the idea of real reaction in the Aristotelian sense of the word, but with a single power – a **potential reality** that exists in case it is used as such if there is a morphosyntactic basis, but also truth understood as an internal ontology and internal existentialization of language. *Language possesses a being*. At the level of morphology, words are constructed in a way that they create semantic information and correspond to the logical construction of the language, but without forgetting the subject that uses the same language. That subject is the bearer of epistemological consciousness as a thought in time, and that consciousness is not given once and for all like the infinite and petrified universe of Democritus. Time, in itself being transient, in the subject in different circumstances can reformulate the value designation of the word which in one historical period meant one thing, and in another moment quite another thing. For example, the use of time in the natural grammar of language fully corresponds to Heidegger's existentialism, e.g. his paradigm that the future as the basis of the present can be recognized in the ontology of the verb, in its inner generic being. So, the verb *I work*, for example, is in its natural time which grammar has defined as present, but from within (in its linguistic being), consciousness can read the existence of other time particles, both from the past tense and from the future tense... If those particles did not exist, in that case, the inner invisible universe of the verb would petrify and would not be able to pass into other time intervals. Reading the verb *I work* as a potentially future tense consists in recognizing the level of inner knowledge of the future tense interval on the basis of the present tense, in the sense that the present tense is continuous and that continuity is composed of a sequence (according to Heidegger), or a line of time composed of innumerable segments of time intervals containing all the particles of time that constantly read the future, but at the same time become particles of moments that have already become part of past actions. So, before the verb *I work*, there is an invisible particle for the future tense – *will*. Formally, this particle will become part of the future when it is objectified. In the same way, in that verb there are parti-

cles, moments from the past tense that have already been completed and replaced by other, new particles from the future tense that are realized at the moment of speaking, with the only difference being that in the manifestation of time, at the moment of speaking begins the domination of the inner particle for past tenses (past perfect, past continuous), and thus the verb formally and logically passes into the past tense. All of the above examples in language achieve one of the main goals – to determine why the traditional Cartesian way of philosophizing was set up as an object subjected to attack, as well as why it was ultimately necessary to strike a blow to the way of thinking whose categories were placed in circulation throughout the overall development of philosophy, especially categories that were not only checked through the tabernacle of historical time, but also in the field of cognition turned into valid epistemological categories from within the philosophical subject or man in general, which were confirmed by linguistic constructions as generic transcendental types of paradigms. What will follow is the erosion of the philosophical system, or a totalitarian form of cognition that will abuse philosophy and degrade it as a political ideological matrix that will be imposed from the position of power as single and non-alternative, or creating the ideological spectrum, philosophy will enter into different ideological constructs in a social field, understood as a type of discourse in which each philosophical idea will be reduced to a level of narrative, linguistic syntax that aims to deatomize that same society, avoiding at all costs any kind of totalitarian discourse.

Excluding the being of language per analogiam deprives the being of the original form of philosophy, and all this has led to the deatomization of human being. This deatomization cannot be performed without pain and suffering as the only other forms of existentialism for man in the time to come, which, according to its formal and linguistic conditionality, is called the future.

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